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Understanding the Barriers to Defendant Participation in Criminal Proceedings in 
England and Wales 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Over the past two decades, there have been significant developments aimed at securing and enhancing 
the participation of witnesses in criminal trials. Most notably, the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999 (YJCEA) introduced a statutory scheme for the use of special measures for non-defendant 
witnesses. The measures, which include screens, live-link and intermediaries, are intended to help 
vulnerable and intimidated witnesses give their best evidence, while minimising the negative emotional 
impact of testifying at a criminal trial.
1
 As concern for vulnerable witnesses has increased, additional 
methods of assistance have been introduced, including ground rules hearings,
2
 pre-recorded cross-
examination,
3
 and changes to the rules on cross-examination.
4
 Some of these developments have been 
extended to vulnerable defendants, yet, the assistance available to them remains inferior to that of 
vulnerable witnesses. In response, there is a growing body of literature which is critical of the 
inadequate and unequal treatment of vulnerable defendants in comparison to vulnerable witnesses.
5
 
However, there remains comparatively little regard for the fact that many defendants who are not 
deemed to be ‘vulnerable’ are unable to participate in criminal proceedings in a meaningful sense.
6
 
	
1 See T Pigot Report of the Advisory Group on Video Evidence (Home Office, 1989); Home Office Speaking up 
for Justice: Report of the Interdepartmental Working Group on the Treatment of Vulnerable or Intimidated 
Witnesses in the Criminal Justice System (Home Office, 1998). 
2 See generally P Cooper, P Backen, R Marchant ‘Getting to grips with ground rules hearings: a checklist for 
judges, advocates and intermediaries to promote the fair treatment of vulnerable people in court’ [2015] Crim LR 
420. See also Criminal Procedure Rules (CrimPR) 3.9(7); Criminal Practice Directions 2015 (CPD) [2015] EWCA 
Crim 1567, General Matters 3E. 
3 Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999 (YJCEA), s 28. Note that s 28 is only partially in force. 
4 See, for example, E Henderson ‘All the proper protections: the Court of Appeal rewrites the rules for the cross-
examination of vulnerable witnesses’ [2014] Crim LR 93. 
5 See L Hoyano ‘Coroners and Justice Act 2009: special measures directions take two: entrenching unequal access 
to justice?’ [2010] Crim LR 345; N Stone ‘Special measures for child defendants: a decade of development’ 
(2010) 10 Youth Justice 174; J Talbot Fair Access to Justice? Support for Vulnerable Defendants in the Criminal 
Courts (Prison Reform Trust, 2012); P Cooper and D Wurtzel ‘A day late and a dollar short: in search of an 
intermediary scheme for vulnerable defendants in England and Wales’ [2013] Crim LR 4; J McEwan ‘Vulnerable 
defendants and the fairness of trials’ [2013] Crim LR 100; R Arthur ‘Giving effect to young people’s right to 
participate effectively in criminal proceedings’ (2016) 28 Child and Family Law Quarterly 223; Law Commission 
Unfitness to Plead (Law Com No 364, 2016); L Hoyano and A Rafferty ‘Rationing defence intermediaries under 
the April 2016 Criminal Practice Direction’ [2017] Crim LR 93; S Fairclough ‘Speaking up for injustice: 
reconsidering the provision of special measures through the lens of equality’ [2018] Crim LR 4. 
6 See generally J Jacobson, G Hunter and A Kirby Inside Crown Court: Personal Experiences and Questions of 
Legitimacy (Bristol: Policy Press, 2016). 
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This article draws attention to the participatory role of all defendants in criminal proceedings. 
It aims to address two questions. First, why should defendants have participatory rights and be capable 
of meaningful participation in criminal proceedings? Second, why has it proven so difficult to attain 
meaningful participation of defendants? The article begins with a brief examination of the key 
participatory rights held by defendants. Consideration is then given to the rationales for equipping 
defendants with such rights. Next, attention is turned to the barriers to meaningful participation. The 
barriers range in nature from the professionalisation and formality of criminal proceedings, to 
courtroom design, to the restrictive eligibility criteria for special measures. It is contended that barriers 
to meaningful communication between the defendant and the court will continue to exist until due 
regard is given to the normative rationales for participatory rights. Instead of being viewed as the subject 
and key stakeholder of the criminal process, the defendant is often treated as an object on which the 
criminal law is imposed. Moreover, when defendant participation is valued primarily as a means of 
increasing efficient fact-finding, as opposed to a mechanism for respecting the autonomy of the 
defendant and providing a means to challenge the prosecution case, there is little incentive to facilitate 
meaningful participation.  
While this article is concerned with the participatory rights of all defendants, it focuses on 
contested trials in the Crown Court. This is because the solemnity of Crown Court trials is reflected not 
only in the maximum sentences for offences triable on indictment, but also in the formality of the 
proceedings which can, in itself, create a barrier to participation. Nonetheless, most of the issues raised 
in this article are of direct relevance to trials in the magistrates’ courts and also extend beyond the 
courtroom and contested trials, as there are barriers to participation and meaningful engagement in the 
police station, pre-trial hearings and sentencing hearings.
7
 With government plans to modernise the 
court process in ways which could affect participation,
8
 including through greater use of technology, it 
is a particularly important time to consider the defendant’s participatory role. A broader aim of this 
	
7 As well as in other parts of the justice system. See, for example, G McKeever ‘A ladder of legal participation 
for tribunal users’ [2013] PL 575. 
8 See, for example, the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Chief Justice, the Senior President of Tribunals Transforming 
Our Justice System (Ministry of Justice, 2016). See also Guidance: The HMCTS Reform Programme, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/guidance/the-hmcts-reform-programme (last accessed 17 May 2020). 
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article is, therefore, to provide material which can be used to assess the defendant’s position as a 
participant during all types of proceedings and at all stages of the criminal process.  
As a final preliminary point, it should be noted that the terms ‘meaningful participation’ and 
‘effective participation’ are used throughout the article. Where the term ‘effective participation’ is used, 
it is in reference to the right to effective participation, as guaranteed by Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The right to effective participation includes particular abilities 
and requirements but, as explained below, its precise scope is uncertain and it has been applied in a 
restrictive manner. It is, therefore, useful to distinguish this right from ‘meaningful participation’. 
‘Meaningful participation’ is employed as a more general term to describe the defendant’s ability to: 
concentrate; follow and understand the proceedings and court process (as and when it unfolds); engage 
with other participants at the trial; make decisions about the conduct of their case, including whether to 
give evidence;
9
 do themselves justice in the witness box; and maintain control over the direction and 
presentation of their case.
10
  
 
2. PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS 
a. The rights 
Defendants have a right to participate in proceedings against themselves. What may be conceived of as 
a broad right to participate consists of a number of specific rights, each of which is recognised either 
expressly or implicitly within the right to a fair trial under Article 6 of the ECHR. These rights include 
the right to be present at one’s trial.
11
 In trials on indictment, there is a requirement to be present, making 
it somewhat difficult to describe as a ‘right’. However, the obligatory nature of attendance in court may 
be justified on the basis that it is in the defendant’s best interest. Presence is a passive form of 
participation which can ensure that the defendant hears the evidence against them and has an 
opportunity to follow the proceedings.
12
 It also facilitates active participation by providing the 
	
9 On the importance of decision making capacity, see Law Commission, above n 5. 
10 Subject to the rules of evidence and procedure. 
11 Colozza v Italy (1985) 7 EHRR 516. 
12 See R v Lee Kun (1916) 1 KB 337 (CA) 341. 
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defendant with an opportunity to challenge the prosecution case through, for example, giving evidence 
or instructing their counsel as the case progresses.
13
 Additionally, the defendant’s presence will prevent 
the jury from drawing an impermissible inference from their absence.
14
 It is, however, possible to 
proceed in the defendant’s absence in the Crown Court, though close regard must be given to the overall 
fairness of the proceedings.
15
  
Beyond the right to be present at trial, the defendant has a ‘right to confrontation’,
16
 which 
consists of several participatory rights recognised in Article 6(3) of the ECHR. Article 6(3)(c), for 
example, provides the defendant with the right to ‘defend himself in person or through legal assistance 
of his own choosing’. Article 6(3)(d) provides the right ‘to examine or have examined witnesses against 
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under the same conditions 
as witnesses against him’. The right to examine witnesses may be more appropriately described as an 
institutional right of the defence, rather than a personal right of the defendant,
17
 since the right can be 
exercised through the defendant’s legal representative. In some circumstances, the defendant is 
prohibited from personally cross-examining a witness, including where the witness is a complainant of 
a sexual offence.
18
 Restrictions on personal cross-examination do not contravene the ECHR, as Article 
6 does not provide the defendant with a right to physically face their accusers.
19
 However, Article 
6(3)(d) does provide support for the defendant’s personal right to be heard and to give evidence on their 
own behalf.
20
  
	
13 To meaningfully participate, the defendant must be capable of both active and passive participation, but active 
and passive participation at trial can be distinguished. Active participation involves mental effort and physical 
movement, often resulting in the production of information and the defendant contributing to the trial. Passive 
participation, on the other hand, requires no direct physical action on the part of the defendant, with the defendant 
receiving, rather than providing, information. 
14 H Riddle and S Jones ‘Trial in absence in a magistrates’ court’ [2013] Crim LR 750, 755. 
15 R v Jones [2002] UKHL 5. For a recent application of this principle, see R v Hussain [2018] EWCA Crim 1785. 
16 See generally I Dennis ‘The right to confront witnesses: meanings, myths and human rights’ [2010] Crim LR 
255.  
17 Ibid, p 266.  
18 YJCEA 1999, ss 34-36. 
19 See R (on the application of D) v Camberwell Green Youth Court [2005] UKHL 4. 
20 By virtue of s 1 of the Criminal Evidence Act 1898, the defendant is a competent witness for the defence. 
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The rights to be present and confront the prosecution’s case are of limited value to the defendant 
if they cannot participate effectively. The right to effective participation is an implied Article 6 right.
21
 
In the case of SC v UK, the European Court explained that ‘The right of an accused to effective 
participation in his or her criminal trial generally includes, inter alia, not only the right to be present, 
but also to hear and follow the proceedings.’
22
 The Court went on to explain that: 
“effective participation” in this context presupposes that the accused has a broad understanding 
of the nature of the trial process and of what is at stake for him or her, including the significance 
of any penalty which may be imposed. It means that he or she, if necessary with the assistance 
of, for example, an interpreter, lawyer, social worker or friend, should be able to understand the 
general thrust of what is said in court. The defendant should be able to follow what is said by 
the prosecution witnesses and, if represented, to explain to his own lawyers his version of 
events, point out any statements with which he disagrees and make them aware of any facts 
which should be put forward in his defence.
 23 
The defendant’s right to legal representation,
24
 and to an interpreter should they need one,
25
 can be 
necessary to ensure effective participation, as can further assistance in the form of special measures and 
trial adjustments.
26
 Overall, the right requires the defendant to be able to maintain a level of general 
understanding and active involvement in their trial.
27
 However, the precise scope of the right is 
unclear.
28
  For example, it does not explicitly include an ability to give evidence, though this is implicit 
in the Article 6(3) rights from which the right to effective participation is derived.
29
 It is less apparent 
whether (or the extent to which) ‘effective participation’ includes an ability to provide intelligible and 
	
21 Stanford v UK App no 16757/90 (ECHR, 23 February 1994). See also T v UK (2000) 30 EHRR 121; SC v UK 
(2005) 40 EHRR 10. 
22 SC v UK, above n 21, at [28]. 
23 Ibid, at [29]. 
24 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), Article 6(3)(c). 
25 ECHR, Article 6(3)(e). 
26 Discussed below. 
27 Law Commission, above n 5, para 3.21. 
28 See generally A Owusu-Bempah ‘The interpretation and application of the right to effective participation’ 
(2018) 22 International Journal of Evidence and Proof 321. 
29 See Stanford v UK, above n 21, at [26]. 
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coherent testimony.
30
 Also, it is not clear where the boundary lies between being unable to participate 
effectively and being ‘unfit to plead’.
31
 The concept of ‘effective participation’ is, therefore, in need of 
further clarification.
32
 Moreover, considering the restrictive way in which the right has been approached 
by the courts, there may be many defendants who are deemed able to participate effectively, yet cannot 
give evidence, follow proceedings or engage with other court users in a meaningful way. For example, 
it has been suggested that the defendant’s right to hear and follow the proceedings can be exercised 
through their lawyer, even where the defendant wishes to exercise the right for themselves.
33
  Before 
examining the barriers to meaningful participation, it is necessary to consider why participatory rights 
are important. 
 
b. The rationales  
Having outlined the key participatory rights of the defendant, we now turn to the rationales for these 
rights. The focus of this section is the broad justifications for equipping defendants with participatory 
rights, and not the specific rationales for each individual right. The starting point is normative, 
considering why the defendant should have participatory rights. Attention is then turned to the 
instrumental value that defendant participation can have for the prosecution and the state. As will be 
shown, prioritising some of the perceived instrumental benefits of participation can undermine the 
normative rationales for participatory rights, resulting in the continuation of barriers to meaningful 
participation. 
The defendant is the focal point and key stakeholder in the criminal process. It is the defendant’s 
behaviour that is in issue and they who will face sanctions, if convicted. In accordance with Kantian 
principles, each individual must be treated with dignity; as an end in themselves and not simply as a 
means to an end.
34
 The defendant should, therefore, be treated as the subject of proceedings, and not as 
	
30 Owusu-Bempah, above n 28, pp 326-328. 
31 On the unclear distinction between effective participation and fitness to plead, and its implications, see Owusu-
Bempah, above n 28, pp 328-331. 
32 As is the concept of fitness to plead. See Law Commission, above n 5. 
33 See Stanford v UK, above n 21; R v Hamberger [2017] EWCA Crim 273. This issue is discussed further below. 
34 See I Kant Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). 
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an object for condemnation and punishment. To be treated with dignity includes being treated as an 
autonomous individual.
35
 This then gives rise to an obligation to try to empathetically engage with the 
defendant’s experience and allow them to express their perspective.
36
 Thus, in the context of criminal 
proceedings, the defendant is intrinsically worthy of dialogue and the criminal trial should attempt to 
engage them in such.
37
 To engage the defendant in a dialogue, and best realise that the defendant is the 
autonomous subject of the proceedings, the defendant must have the right and opportunity to be heard 
and to respond to the accusations made against them. Moreover, serious consideration must be given to 
whatever the defendant has to say.  
This conception of the purpose of participatory rights draws from the work of Ho. Ho proposes 
that trials should not merely be understood as a means of bringing criminals to justice, but more 
importantly, as a matter of doing justice to the accused.
38
 Doing justice to accused persons is a political 
obligation owed by the state to the citizens it seeks to censure and punish. It is owed in order to uphold 
principles of liberal democracy, including autonomy, and to prevent the oppression of a ‘police state’.
39
 
According to Ho: 
The value of participation, the ability to control and influence one's case, lies in the intrinsic 
value of self-direction … independently of its contribution to the probabilities of reaching the 
correct verdict. Citizens are not objects to be acted upon and kept away by the state for the sake 
of public safety and order; they are individuals that bear rights against the state in the process 
that seeks their conviction and punishment.
40
  
Duff et al. also advance a conception of the criminal trial based on communication with the defendant.
41
 
For them, the criminal trial is, at least in ambition, ‘a communicative process in which the defendant 
	
35 C McCrudden ‘Human dignity and judicial interpretation of human rights’ (2008) 19 European Journal of 
International Law 655, 659-660. Kant in particular has become closely affiliated with the idea of dignity as 
autonomy. See Kant, above n 34. 
36 C MacKenzie ‘Relational autonomy, normative authority and perfectionism’ (2008) 39 Journal of Social 
Philosophy 512, 516.  
37 HL Ho ‘Liberalism and the criminal trial’ [2010] Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 87, 105. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ibid, p 99. 
40 Ibid, p 100. 
41 A Duff, L Farmer, S Marshall and V Tadros The Trial on Trial 3: Towards a Normative Theory of the Criminal 
Trial (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2007). 
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ought to be respected as a participant rather than merely treated as an object.’
42
 The defendant should 
be given a central, and ideally an active, role in the trial.
43
 Duff et al.’s normative arguments highlight 
the importance of facilitating meaningful communication. They recognise that, if we want to protect 
citizens against the state’s potentially oppressive penal power, we should allow, and assist, them to 
respond to accusations that the state brings against them.
44
 It should be added that the state’s oppressive 
penal power can be inflicted upon defendants not only through formal sanctions post-conviction, but 
also during the criminal process itself, through assaults on dignity and personhood resulting from, for 
example, the routine silencing of the defendant.
45
 The silencing of defendants should also be avoided 
because it denies a voice to, and further disempowers, the disadvantaged groups who tend to be 
prosecuted, namely the poor and undereducated. As a result, the process that generates our justice 
system proceeds without these voices, thus reinforcing ‘the social and psychological gaps between 
defendants and those who adjudicate them’.
46
 
Duff et al. take their communicative conception of the trial further by suggesting that the 
function of the trial is to call the defendant to account and to communicate with the defendant to get 
them to see and accept what they have done wrong. Thus, the defendant is called to answer an allegation 
of wrongdoing and to account for that wrongdoing, if proved. If the defendant does not exercise their 
right to be heard, the positive purpose of the trial is frustrated.
47
 Conversely, it is submitted that the 
proper purpose of the trial is to call the state to account for the accusations made against the defendant 
and its request for condemnation and punishment of the defendant.
48
 Within this latter conception of 
	
42 Ibid, p 153. 
43 A Duff, L Farmer, S Marshall and V Tadros (eds) The Trial on Trial 2: Judgment and Calling to Account 
(Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2006) p 3. 
44 Duff et al, above n 41, p 101. 
45 On the court process and practices as a means of inflicting epistemic violence, see E Brissette ‘Bad subjects: 
epistemic violence at arraignment’ (2018) Theoretical Criminology, published online, available at 
https://doi.org/10.1177/1362480618799743 (last accessed 17 May 2020). 
46 A Natapoff ‘Speechless: the silencing of criminal defendants’ (2005) 80 New York University Law Review 
1449, 1452. See below for further discussion on the implications of the socio-economic disparities within the 
criminal justice system. 
47 Duff et al, above n 41, p 102. 
48 See Ho, above n 37; A Owusu-Bempah Defendant Participation in the Criminal Process (Abingdon: Routledge, 
2017) ch 4. 
9	
	
the trial, the right to participate is fundamental, but does not need to be exercised, at least not in an 
active way. 
Given that the defendant has the right to be presumed innocent and the burden of proof 
ordinarily rests on the prosecution,
49
 the criminal trial provides a forum to put the prosecution to proof.
50
 
In other words, the state must account for (and justify) the accusations made against the defendant. The 
state is accountable to both the defendant and to the wider public, given that members of the public are 
subject to state laws, and have an interest in the state acting within its powers.
51
 While attempt should 
be made to engage the defendant in a dialogue, it is ultimately for the state, through its prosecutorial 
agencies, to establish guilt. At a minimum, then, engaging the defendant in a dialogue may amount to 
putting the case to the defendant in a way which they can understand, and providing an opportunity for 
them to respond. The defendant need not respond and, if the jury is not satisfied that guilt has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the defendant should be acquitted. Where the defendant does 
respond, either personally or through instructions provided to their legal representative, the exercise of 
participatory rights furthers the objective of calling the state to account; participatory rights provide a 
means for the defendant to challenge the prosecution case by actively disputing it or by putting forward 
their own version of events which cast doubt on the prosecution case. In order for the defendant to 
challenge the prosecution case, or at least understand how and why the prosecution has or has not met 
its burden of proof, the defendant must be able to follow, understand, and (if they choose) actively 
contribute to the proceedings. In other words, the defendant must be in a position to meaningfully 
participate. 
The above analysis contends that, regardless of whether participatory rights are exercised by 
the defendant, they convey respect for the defendant’s status as the autonomous subject of the 
proceedings, and they provide a mechanism for calling the state to account. However, some benefits of 
participatory rights are attained only when the rights are exercised. For example, defendant participation 
can increase the perceived legitimacy of the process and the outcome; defendants, as well as the wider 
	
49 ECHR, Article 6(2); Woolmington v DPP [1935] AC 462 (HL). 
50 See J Langbein The Origins of the Adversary Criminal Trial (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
51 Owusu-Bempah, above n 48, p 9. 
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community, may be more willing to accept verdicts if the defendant participates.
52
 Moreover, defendant 
participation can assist in achieving a factually accurate verdict. Where the defendant challenges the 
case against them through active participation, weaknesses or errors in the prosecution case may be 
exposed. At the same time, the defendant’s participation can assist the state in building and presenting 
a case, by, for example, providing information that could be used against the defendant. Participation 
can also further the state’s ever-growing quest for an efficient criminal justice system.
53
 Active and 
cooperative defendants can prevent delay by ensuring early identification of the issues in the case, as 
required by the Criminal Procedure Rules.
54
 In court, the defendant is likely to be the most efficient 
witness, able to answer questions which go directly to the facts in issue, while instructions provided to 
counsel can ensure that questioning of witnesses is confined to the relevant issues. 
The potential benefits of the defendant’s active participation should not overshadow the fact 
that it is an exercise of autonomy, and, therefore, should not be compelled. The right to be presumed 
innocent applies regardless of the role the defendant takes at trial. Moreover, the full benefits of the 
defendant’s participation are most likely to be acquired if it is voluntary. Obligatory participation may, 
for example, increase the risk of wrongful conviction, as explained below. Also, the perception of 
legitimacy may depend not only on the fact of participation, but on the quality of the interaction between 
the state and the defendant.
55
 It is, therefore, important to recognise that the rights to participate exist 
alongside rights not to participate, notably the privilege against self-incrimination and the right to 
silence, both of which are implied Article 6 rights.
56
 The participatory rights and the rights not to 
participate are not in conflict. If one considers that the right to participate provides a choice, rather than 
an obligation or expectation, then both can easily be accommodated. As Ho puts it, ‘It is in recognition 
	
52 J Jackson and S Summers The Internationalisation of Criminal Evidence: Beyond the Common Law and Civil 
Law Traditions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012) pp 24-25. See also T Tyler Why People Obey the 
Law (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
53 See, for example, Sir Brian Leveson Review of Efficiency in Criminal Proceedings (Judiciary of England and 
Wales, 2015). See also CrimPR 1.1(2)(e), under which the overriding objective of dealing with cases justly 
includes dealing with cases efficiently and expeditiously. 
54 CrimPR 3.2(2)(a). 
55 Ho, above n 37, p 90. 
56 Murray v UK (1996) 22 EHRR 29. 
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of the person’s autonomy that we do not force him or her to participate at the trial and, at the same time, 
give that person the cherished right to do so.’
57
 
It has been submitted that the rationales for participatory rights should be viewed in terms of 
respect for the defendant’s position as the autonomous subject of the proceedings and as a mechanism 
for calling the state to account. However, given that the exercise of participatory rights can be of 
instrumental value to the state, a number of participatory requirements have emerged, with the 
defendant being penalised for non-cooperation, thus undermining the defendant’s rights not to 
participate.
58
 For example, a failure to answer police questions or give evidence in court can, under 
certain circumstances, give rise to an adverse inference, allowing the court or jury to treat non-
participation as evidence of guilt.
59
 Likewise, adverse inferences can be drawn from a failure to comply 
with requirements to disclose the details of one’s defence before trial, and to do so in a manner that is 
timely and consistent with the defence presented in court.
60
 
Requiring participation, as opposed to facilitating it, demonstrates complete disregard for the 
defendant’s autonomy and could put defendants at risk of wrongful conviction. Coerced participation 
may result in the production of falsely incriminating information, or a lack of participation may be 
wrongly attributed to guilt.
61
 Nonetheless, a purpose of the state requiring participation seems to be to 
increase the prospect of a conviction; either the defendant will provide information which may assist 
the prosecution, or the imposition of a penalty for non-cooperation will help to secure a conviction.
62
 
Thus, while there are multiple and, at times, conflicting benefits of defendant participation, in practice, 
it seems to be sought and valued primarily on the state’s terms, as a means of achieving speedy outcomes 
	
57 Ho, above n 37, p 105. 
58 See Owusu-Bempah, above n 48. 
59 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, ss 34-39. 
60 Criminal Procedure and Investigations Act 1996, ss 5 and 11. 
61 It was for these reasons that the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice advised against allowing adverse 
inferences to be drawn from silence. See Royal Commission on Criminal Justice Report, Cm 2263, 1993, ch 4. 
62 For example, the law allowing adverse inferences to be drawn from silence is intended to prevent defendants 
from evading conviction by hiding behind silence. In R v Hoare [2004] EWCA Crim 784, Auld LJ explained that 
‘the section 34 inference is concerned with flushing out innocence at an early stage or supporting other evidence 
of guilt at a later stage’ (at [54]). For a review of the debates that preceded the enactment of ss 34-39 of the 
Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, see M Zander ‘Abolition of the right to silence, 1972-1994’ in D 
Morgan and GM Stephenson (eds) Suspicion and Silence: The Right to Silence in Criminal Investigations 
(London: Blackstone Press, 1994). 
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(ideally, from the state’s perspective, a conviction). If this is how the defendant’s participation is valued, 
this could explain why there continue to be so many barriers to meaningful participation and 
communication between the defendant and the court. When the focus is on efficient fact-finding, rather 
than respecting autonomy and holding the state to account (or even the legitimacy of outcomes), there 
is less incentive to facilitate meaningful participation, and more incentive to treat the defendant as an 
object and evidential resource. 
 
3. BARRIERS TO MEANINGFUL PARTICIPATION  
The position taken in this article is that defendants should be treated as the subject of court proceedings. 
However, defendants often appear to be the least important character in court. In their study of the 
publics’ experience of the Crown Court, Jacobson et al. describe defendants as ‘ever-present extras’ 
and ‘mere observers as their fate is decided’.
63
 Defendants tend not to be engaged in court processes or 
procedures, and, when giving evidence, may struggle to understand or respond to questions. There are 
numerous barriers to meaningful participation and communication in criminal proceedings which both 
enable and result in the defendant’s treatment as an object rather than the subject of the proceedings. It 
is not possible to address all of the barriers within the scope of this article. However, to appreciate the 
extent to which the normative rationales of participatory rights have been overlooked, often in 
pursuance of efficient fact-finding, and to determine how best to facilitate meaningful participation, it 
is necessary to highlight some of the most significant barriers. 
 
a. Formality and professionalisation of the criminal process  
A legal culture which discourages the defendant’s active participation developed over a long period of 
time, largely as a result of the emergence of adversarialism in the eighteenth century.
64
 In particular, an 
	
63 Jacobson et al, above n 6, pp 83 and 202. See also J Jacobson, G Hunter and A Kirby ‘Supporting the effective 
participation of defendants in court proceedings’ (Birkbeck, University of London, 2014); A Kirby, J Jacobson 
and G Hunter ‘Effective participation or passive acceptance: how can defendants participate more effectively in 
the court process?’ Howard League What is Justice? Working Papers (The Howard League for Penal Reform, 
2014). 
64 See Langbein, above n 50. 
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increase in the use of lawyers meant that defendants did not have to speak for themselves in order to 
avoid conviction.
65
 While many fair trial rights, including the presumption of innocence, are better 
safeguarded under adversarialism than in the pre-adversarial system, the professionalisation of the 
criminal trial distanced the defendant from the court process.
66
 When lawyers take responsibility for the 
conduct and presentation of the case, the role of the defendant can be ‘effectively confined to that of a 
spectator’,
67
 resulting in defendants feeling incidental to criminal proceedings.
68
 In his study of Wood 
Green Crown Court, published in 1993, Rock found that the defendant ‘would often be discussed as if 
he were not present’.
69
 Since then, courts have become required to take reasonable steps to facilitate the 
participation of defendants, as stated in the Criminal Procedure Rules, discussed below,
70
 and many 
lawyers seek to engage the defendant. At the same time, however, the focus on managerialism within 
the Criminal Procedure Rules is likely to have exacerbated the exclusion of the defendant from the 
criminal process. Judges have extensive case management duties under Part 3 of the Rules. They must, 
with the assistance of the lawyers, actively manage the case in furtherance of the overriding objective 
of dealing with cases justly.
71
 Dealing with cases justly includes ‘dealing with cases efficiently and 
expeditiously’.
72
 In pursuit of this goal, judges are tasked with, inter alia, encouraging agreement 
between parties and ensuring that trials begin promptly, are as narrowly focussed as possible, and do 
not last longer than necessary.
73
 By prioritising efficiency and expediency, the defendant, who has little 
say in administrative matters, becomes further marginalised, while legal professionals dictate the 
progress of the case. 
	
65 See JM Beattie Crime and the Courts in England 1660-1800 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986); JM Beattie 
‘Scales of justice: defense counsel and the English criminal trial in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries’ (1991) 
9 Law and History Review 221. 
66 On the ‘differentiation’ between barristers and their clients, see L Mulcahy Legal Architecture: Justice, Due 
Process and the Place of Law (Abingdon: Routledge, 2011) pp 60-64. On the changing role of defendants, see 
also, R Gimson ‘The mutable defendant: from penitent to rights-bearing and beyond’ (2020) 40 LS 113. 
67 W Wohlers ‘The role of counsel in criminal proceedings: differences between common law and civil law 
systems’ in J Jackson and S Summers (eds) Obstacles to Fairness in Criminal Proceedings: Individual Rights and 
Institutional Forms (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2018) p 135. 
68 Jacobson et al, above n 6, p 97. 
69 P Rock The Social World of an English Crown Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993) p 240. 
70 CrimPR 3.9(3). 
71 CrimPR 3.2 and 3.3. 
72 CrimPR 1.1(2)(e). 
73 J McEwan ‘From adversarialism to managerialism: criminal justice in transition’ (2011) 31 LS 519, 527. 
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 The professionalisation of the trial is also evident in the case law on the right to effective 
participation. As noted above, the courts have found it possible (and even sufficient) for the right to be 
exercised by proxy. Thus, Article 6 does not always require that the defendant is able to hear and follow 
proceedings, as long as their legal representatives can.
74
 This approach to effective participation is at 
odds with the rationales for participatory rights advocated above. The right to follow proceedings should 
be a personal one which can be exercised by the defendant.
75
 If the defendant is to be treated as the 
subject of the proceedings, as someone who can challenge the case against them and understand the 
basis for conviction or acquittal, they must be able to hear, understand and engage with what is said in 
court. This is not to suggest that every defendant must understand every point of law or evidential detail 
that is discussed or presented in court. Given the complex nature of criminal and procedural law, it is 
unobjectionable to expect counsel to explain some matters to the defendant.
76
 However, this must be 
kept within limits. To put the onus on the defendant’s lawyer to explain to the defendant everything that 
has been done or said in court, after it has been done or said, further excludes the defendant from the 
proceedings and undermines their role as a participant.
77
 It is also important to acknowledge that a small 
minority of defendants in the Crown Court are not legally represented.
78
 Unrepresented defendants often 
have little prospect of comprehending all of the laws and rules on procedure, or presenting their case 
coherently,
79
 yet are deemed able to participate effectively. Consequently, in practice, there may be no 
real expectation that defendants are personally able to follow court proceedings, and defendants may 
	
74 See Stanford v UK, above n 21; R v Hamberger, above n 33. However, in order to effectively participate by 
proxy, the defendant must be able to instruct and adequately communicate with their lawyer outside of the 
courtroom. See T v UK, above n 21, at [90].  
75 S Trechsel Human Rights in Criminal Proceedings (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) pp 253, 335. 
76 The right to effective participation does not require that the defendant should understand or be capable of 
understanding every point of law or evidential detail, given the right to legal representation. See SC v UK, above 
n 21, at [29]. 
77 Owusu-Bempah, above n 28, pp 332-333. 
78 In 2017, 5% of defendants in the Crown Court were unrepresented at the first hearing. Ministry of Justice 
Criminal Court Statistics (Quarterly): January to March 2018, p 17, available at  
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/720026/ccsq-
bulletin-jan-mar-2018.pdf (last accessed 17 May 2020). A rise in the number of unrepresented defendants in recent 
years has been attributed to cuts to legal aid. See O Bowcott ‘Jump in Unrepresented Defendants as Legal Aid 
Cuts Continue to Bite’ The Guardian (London, 24 November 2019) available at 
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2019/nov/24/legal-aid-cuts-prompt-rise-in-unrepresented-defendants (last 
accessed 17 May 2020). 
79 See Transform Justice Justice Denied? The Experience of Unrepresented Defendants in the Criminal Courts 
(Transform Justice, 2016) available at http://www.transformjustice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/TJ-
APRIL_Singles.pdf (last accessed 17 May 2020). 
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resign themselves to being unable to fully follow what is happening. To rectify this, a broader approach 
to what constitutes ‘effective participation’ must be adopted.
80
 In particular, understanding and 
engagement by legal representatives should not be treated as a substitute for that of the defendant.
 
 
Related to professionalisation is the formality of trial proceedings. This can cause defendants 
to feel uncomfortable, intimidated and alienated, particularly in the Crown Court where judges and 
counsel wear wigs and gowns. In their study,
 
Jacobson et al. note ‘a lack of understanding of both the 
court procedure and the language used by legal professionals, which together generate the sense of a 
voice unheard, or lost, in the complex mechanisms of the courtroom’.
81
 Defendants seemed to accept 
that courts are a world in themselves on which outsiders have little impact.
82
 One of the defendants 
interviewed for the study summed up the situation as follows: ‘Well, it’s posh innit? The courts are 
posh. It’s all posh to me, everyone in wigs; everyone talks in this funky language.’
83
 The situation is 
worse for children
84
 and defendants with learning disabilities or communication difficulties.
85
 Such 
individuals have been recorded as finding the criminal justice system ‘scary’, being confused and 
finding it hard to understand what is happening in court, pretending to understand, and being eager for 
the proceedings to come to an end.
86
 These defendants might be classed as ‘vulnerable’ and entitled to 
special measures or trial adjustments, as explained below. However, even where special measures and 
trial adjustments are available, the assistance may not fully alleviate the difficulties faced by defendants. 
For some defendants, experiences of exclusion may be worsened by an inability to relate to 
those who are running their case, due to variations in racial and socio-economic backgrounds. These 
variations are demonstrated by the available statistics. For example, in 2016, 21 percent of those 
proceeded against in court for indictable offences were from a Black, Asian, Mixed, Chinese or ‘Other’ 
	
80 See Owusu-Bempah, above n 28.	
81 Kirby et al, above n 63, p 6. These findings echo those of earlier studies, such as Rock, above n 69. 
82 Jacobson et al, above n 6, p 197. 
83 Ibid, p 101. 
84 See, for example, Lord Carlile Independent Parliamentarians’ Inquiry into the Operation and Effectiveness of 
the Youth Court (Ministry of Justice, 2014); A Wigzel, A Kirby and J Jacobson The Youth Proceedings Advocacy 
Review: Final Report (Institute for Criminal Policy Research, 2015). 
85 See, for example, J Jacobson and J Talbot Vulnerable Defendants in the Criminal Courts: A Review of Provision 
for Adults and Children (Prison Reform Trust, 2009). 
86 See J Talbot, W Clegg and A Fletcher ‘Vulnerable voices?’ in P Cooper and L Hunting (eds) Addressing 
Vulnerability in Justice Systems (London: Wildly, 2016). 
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ethnic background,
87
 whereas just six percent of court judges were categorised as being from a Black, 
Asian or Minority Ethnic background.
88
 Breaking this down further, in 2016, 11 percent of those 
proceeded against for indictable offences were black,
89
 whereas, in 2018, only one percent of court 
judges
90
 and 2.8 percent of barristers were black.
91
 This can be compared to approximately three percent 
of the general population of England and Wales.
92
 In terms of education, a disproportionate number of 
barristers attended a UK independent school in comparison to the general population.
93
 While the 
number of defendants who attended independent schools is unknown, it is likely to be below the average 
for the wider population.
94
 Research shows that convicted offenders, particularly young offenders, tend 
to be under-educated,
95
 and levels of learning disabilities are disproportionately high among 
defendants.
96
  
As well as heightening feelings of alienation and discomfort which can inhibit and discourage 
participation, disparities in racial and socio-economic background can result in anger and cynicism. 
	
87 Ministry of Justice Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice System 2016 (Ministry of Justice, 2017) p 44, 
available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/669094/statist
ics_on_race_and_the_criminal_justice_system_2016_v2.pdf (last accessed 17 May 2020). 
88 Judicial Office Judicial Diversity Statistics 2016 (Judicial Office, 2016) p 8, available at 
https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/judicial-diversity-statistics-2december.pdf (last accessed 
17 May 2020). The figure rose to 7% in 2018. See Judicial Office Judicial Diversity Statistics 2018 (Judicial 
Office, 2018) p 5, available at https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/judicial-diversity-statistics-
2018-1.pdf (last accessed 17 May 2020).  
89 Ministry of Justice, above n 87, p 44.  
90 Judicial Office Judicial Diversity Statistics 2018 (Judicial Office, 2018) p 5. The judicial diversity statistics for 
2016 do not specify the proportion of black judges. Given that the proportion of Black, Asian or Minority Ethnic 
judges has increased slightly since 2016, it is unlikely that there were more black judges in 2016 than in 2018.  
91 Bar Standards Board Diversity at the Bar 2018 (Bar Standards Board, 2019) p 12, available at 
https://www.barstandardsboard.org.uk/media/1975681/diversity_at_the_bar_2018.pdf (last accessed 17 May 
2020). The overall percentage of Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic barristers at the Bar in December 2018 was 
13%. 
92 Office for National Statistics 2011 Census: General Report for England and Wales, available at 
https://www.ons.gov.uk/census/2011census/howourcensusworks/howdidwedoin2011/2011censusgeneralreport 
(last accessed 17 May 2020). 
93 The Bar Standards Board suggests that the figure is 15.5%, taking account of a high non-response rate. See Bar 
Standards Board, above n 91, p 19. 
94 The Independent Schools Council suggests that over 7% of school children in England attend an independent 
school, available at https://www.isc.co.uk/research/ (last accessed 17 May 2020). 
95 See, for example, HM Government Reducing Reoffending through Skills and Employment, Cm 6702, 2005; J 
Talbot Seen and Heard: Supporting Vulnerable Children in the Youth Justice System (Prison Reform Trust, 2010). 
96 Research indicates that between 20% and 30% of offenders have learning difficulties or learning disabilities 
that interfere with their ability to cope within the criminal justice system. See N Loucks Prisoners with Learning 
Difficulties and Learning Disabilities – Review of Prevalence and Associated Needs (Prison Reform Trust, 2007). 
Communication difficulties are most prevalent amongst children, with over 60% of children who offend having 
communication difficulties. See Talbot, above n 5. 
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Some defendants perceive decisions and outcomes as being influenced by bias or discrimination based 
on personal circumstances, such as class and ethnicity.
97
 Perceptions of bias may not be misplaced, as 
statistics show that people from ethnic minority backgrounds, and black people in particular, are 
disproportionately represented throughout the criminal process.
98
 One possible (or partial) way to 
facilitate greater and more meaningful defendant participation is to create a more diverse and 
representative legal profession,
99
 as well as addressing the causes of the overrepresentation of socially 
disadvantaged individuals and individuals from ethnic minority groups as defendants. However, while 
better representation may reduce the discomfort or exclusion of some defendants, it is an insufficient 
solution. 
For decades, researchers have noted an ‘us and them’ division between legal professionals and 
lay court users.
100
 The divide stems largely from the factors outlined above: formality; language; 
background; and, also, camaraderie between legal professionals. However, the divide is not only a 
consequence of procedural tradition or the complex nature of court proceedings. It can also be viewed 
as a way of protecting the integrity of the legal process and sustaining the courts’ aura of authority.
101
 
Additionally, while many lawyers make great effort to engage with lay participants, for some, the 
division might be thought to reinforce the perception of superiority of legal professionals and their 
	
97 Jacobson et al, above n 6, pp 182-184. See also R Hood, S Shute and F Seemungal Ethnic Minorities in the 
Criminal Courts: Perceptions of Fairness and Equality of Treatment (Department of Constitutional Affairs, 
2003); K Irwin-Rogers and M Shuter Fairness in the Criminal Justice System: What’s Race got to do with it? 
(Catch 22, 2017) available at https://www.catch-22.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/Fairness-in-the-criminal-
justice-system-full-report-3.pdf?utm_source=download&utm_medium=google_form&utm_campaign=lammy 
(last accessed 17 May 2020); P Bowen Building Trust: How our Courts can Improve the Criminal Court 
Experience for Black, Asian, and Minority Ethnic Defendants (Centre for Justice Innovation, 2017) available at 
http://justiceinnovation.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/Building-Trust.pdf (last accessed 17 May 2020). 
98 Ministry of Justice Black, Asian and Minority Ethnic Disproportionality in the Criminal Justice System in 
England and Wales (Ministry of Justice, 2016); Ministry of Justice Statistics on Race and the Criminal Justice 
System 2016 (Ministry of Justice, 2017). See also D Lammy The Lammy Review (Ministry of Justice, 2017) 
available at 
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/643001/lamm
y-review-final-report.pdf (last accessed 17 May 2020).  
99 For example, David Lammy has recommended greater diversity among judges and magistrates. See Lammy, 
above n 98. 
100 See, for example, P Carlen Magistrates’ Justice (London: Martin Robertson, 1976); Rock, above n 69; N 
Fielding Courting Violence: Offences Against the Person Cases in Court (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); 
Jacobson et al, above n 6. 
101 Jacobson et al, above n 6, pp 96 and 201. 
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ability to ‘manage and manipulate’ proceedings through, for example, inaccessible language.
102
 This 
may be lost if defendants (and other lay court users) were fully able to engage with the process.
103
 Yet, 
the present situation, within which many defendants struggle to understand basic concepts and 
processes, cannot be justified on the basis that it maintains the superiority of legal professionals over 
lay court users. Nor is a strong division between legal professionals and lay court users necessary to 
maintain order or the courts’ authority.  Arguably, those who are able to fully understand and participate 
in proceedings are also best able to appreciate the seriousness of the proceedings and what is at stake.  
To prevent the ‘othering’ of defendants, greater recognition and appreciation of the rationales 
for participatory rights is required. Defendants should be at the centre of the criminal process. They 
must be seen and treated as the autonomous subject of the proceedings, as being worthy of engagement 
in a dialogue, and their participation viewed as a mechanism for calling the state to account. One way 
to better facilitate this could be through a change to the relationship between the defendant and their 
lawyer. Wohlers has advocated a system of ‘hybrid representation’, whereby the defendant effectively 
acts as co-counsel. Defence counsel assists the defendant in conducting and presenting their case, rather 
than assuming control over the case.
104
 This would allow the defendant to determine the direction and 
leadership of the defence, while providing the opportunity to engage directly and actively in the 
proceedings. However, it would also represent a substantial change in approach, and its success would 
depend on the defendant’s ability to understand and engage in the process which, at present, is often 
lacking. It may, therefore, be more useful to first focus on creating a general change in ‘court culture’,
105
 
to enable defendants to better engage with the court.   
Several commentators have advocated a procedural justice approach to criminal proceedings,
106
 
whereby fair and respectful treatment and neutral decision-making can increase the perceived 
	
102 See Fielding, above n 100, p109 and ch 5. See also Rock, above n 69, pp 61-62. On the courts as a mechanism 
for social control, see Carlen, above n 100. 
103 Jacobson et al, above n 6, p 98. 
104 See Wohlers, above n 67, ch 7. See also J Colquitt ‘Hybrid representation: standing the two-sided coin on its 
edge’ (2003) 38 Wake Forest Law Review 55. 
105 A Kirby ‘Effectively engaging victims, witnesses and defendants in the criminal courts: a question of "court 
culture"?’ [2017] Crim LR 949. 
106 See, for example, E Gold LaGratta and P Bowen To be Fair: Procedural Fairness in Courts (Criminal Justice 
Alliance, 2014) available at http://criminaljusticealliance.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/TobeFair.pdf (last 
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legitimacy of the system, as well as foster meaningful engagement and improve understanding.
107
 Such 
an approach is consistent with the normative rationales for participatory rights, as it promotes ‘doing 
justice’ to the accused. In practical terms, procedural justice requires that defendants are treated with 
courtesy and respect, that they are kept informed and provided with a clear explanation of what is 
happening and why, and that they have an opportunity to be heard and are taken seriously when they 
choose to speak.
108
 Since formal and antiquated legal language has been cited by many defendants as a 
barrier to understanding, procedural justice may necessitate the adoption of clear and simple language 
at all times during court proceedings. This could benefit all lay court users, including those in the public 
gallery. To this end, the civil liberties organisation, JUSTICE, has recommended that ‘there be a 
judiciary-led consultation with the profession into modes of address, and commonly misunderstood 
terminology, and whether they continue to serve a useful purpose when set against any alienating impact 
they may have.’
109
 Many defendants could also benefit from being provided with a glossary of key legal 
terms and answers to frequently asked questions about the court process. It has also been suggested that 
simple gestures can indicate to defendants that they are being treated with respect. These gestures 
include: legal professionals introducing themselves and making eye contact;
110
 judges asking 
defendants what questions they have;
111
 and speaking to defendants in a non-authoritarian manner.
112
 If 
we are to take participatory rights seriously, criminal proceedings must be transparent and accessible, 
	
accessed 17 May 2020); Bowen, above n 97, pp 18-20; J Thomas, C Ely and B Estep A Fairer Way: Procedural 
Fairness for Young Adults at Court (Centre for Justice Innovation, 2018) available at 
https://justiceinnovation.org/publications/fairer-way-procedural-fairness-young-adults-court (last accessed 17 
May 2020).  
107 See, for example, Tyler, above n 52; T Tyler ‘Procedural justice, legitimacy, and the effective rule of law’ 
(2003) 30 Crime and Justice 283; T Tyler ‘Procedural justice and the courts’ (2007) 44 Court Review 26; K Kwok-
yin Cheng ‘Legitimacy in a postcolonial legal system: public perception of procedural justice and moral alignment 
toward the courts in Hong Kong’ (2018) 43 Law and Social Inquiry 212.  
108 Tyler identified four key procedural justice principles: voice, neutrality, respect and trust. See T Tyler 
‘Procedural justice and the courts’ (2007) 44 Court Review 26, 30–31. 
109 Justice Understanding Courts (Justice, 2019) p 67, available at https://justice.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2019/01/Understanding-Courts.pdf (last accessed 17 May 2020). See also, The Equal Treatment 
Bench Book (Judicial College, 2018) 4. 
110 Bowen, above n 97, p 18. 
111 Gold LaGratta and Bowen, above n 106, p 6. 
112 See also Justice, above n 109, which makes a number of practical recommendations aimed at facilitating 
participation and improving lay people’s understanding of the court process. 
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with a focus on the ‘promotion of respectful, considerate and empathetic interactions’.
113
 Further 
suggestions for facilitating defendant participation are considered below, in relation to other significant 
barriers to participation. 
 
b. The dock 
The architecture and design of many court buildings and courtrooms make them intimidating places for 
those who are unfamiliar with them.
114
 As with the factors set out above, this works to separate the 
defendant from the legal professionals and can exacerbate feelings of exclusion, alienation and an 
inability to take part in proceedings. However, the biggest barrier to participation, in terms of the court 
environment, is arguably the defendant’s position in the dock.
115
 In the Crown Court, the dock is situated 
at the back of the courtroom and is usually a ‘secure dock’. Secure docks extend from floor to ceiling 
and are glass-fronted. Mulcahy observes that the defendant in a secure dock is effectively placed in a 
separate room within the courtroom.
116
 This does little to signal that the defendant is central to the 
trial.
117
 Moreover, the courtroom is typically designed such that attention is directed towards the lawyers 
in the centre of the courtroom, who face the judge and have their backs turned to the defendant. While 
the positions reserved for lawyers for the defence and prosecution are equivalent, the position reserved 
for defendants is comparatively marginal and inferior.
118
  
	
113 Kirby, above n 105, p 968. In an adversarial trial, the extent to which the prosecution can be expected to treat 
the defendant with empathy may be limited, particularly if the prosecution case is that the defendant is lying. 
Nonetheless, the prosecution can approach and engage the defendant in a respectful manner. 
114 On the significance of court architecture and design, see generally Mulcahy, above n 66; L Mulcahy and E 
Rowden The Democratic Courthouse: A Modern History of Design, Due Process and Dignity (Abingdon: 
Routledge, 2020). See also Rock, above n 69, ch 6. 
115 While it is routine for defendants to sit in the dock, there is an exception for children and other vulnerable 
defendants. In accordance with the Criminal Practice Directions, ‘a vulnerable defendant, especially if he is young, 
should normally, if he wishes, be free to sit with members of his family or others in a like relationship, and with 
some other suitable supporting adult such as a social worker, and in a place which permits easy, informal 
communication with his legal representatives.’ CPD 3G.8. However, this exception is not automatic and 
placement of young defendants in the dock will not necessarily render a trial unfair. See R v McGill, Hewitt and 
Hewitt [2017] EWCA Crim 1228. 
116 L Mulcahy ‘Putting the defendant in their place: why do we still use the dock in criminal proceedings?’ (2013) 
53 British Journal of Criminology 1139, 1144. 
117 Ibid, p 1143. 
118 J Miller ‘A rights-based argument against the dock’ [2011] Crim LR 216, 220. 
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By marginalising the defendant, use of the dock prevents meaningful participation in several 
ways. The physical separation of the defendant from their legal representatives means that there is little 
opportunity for the defendant to provide instructions, alert their counsel to inaccuracies during a 
witness’s testimony, or to suggest questions for cross-examination. According to Stone and Blackstock, 
consultation with counsel ‘is subject to gaining their attention by banging, waving and other demeaning 
methods; consultation is done within hearing of other parties, the dock officer, anyone else in the dock, 
and if it is particularly difficult to communicate through the glass, everyone else in the courtroom.’
 119
 
Thus, confinement to the dock prohibits free and uninterrupted consultation and suggestion during the 
trial.
120
 It can also be difficult for defendants to hear proceedings from the dock,
121
 meaning that even 
those who are capable of understanding and engaging in the court process cannot properly follow the 
proceedings.  As Mulcahy notes, ‘rather than facilitating their participation in the trial, the use of the 
dock appears to signal the expectation that the defendant remains silent and passive’.
122
 However, 
defendants should not be too silent; if they fail to testify, adverse inferences may be drawn against them. 
Thus, during the course of the trial, defendant participation is sought by the state, but only when the 
defendant is called to give evidence.
123
 As well as preventing participation, the dock has been criticised 
on the basis that it is likely to prejudice the jury against the defendant by making the defendant appear 
guilty
124
 and increasing the prospect of a conviction.
125
 
Use of the dock indicates lack of concern about, or awareness of, the rationales which should 
underpin participatory rights. Far from being enabled to challenge the prosecution case or engage in a 
dialogue as the autonomous subject of the proceedings, the defendant in the dock is ‘a man apart. He is 
	
119 J Stone and J Blackstock ‘Violating the right to a fair trial? the secure dock in England and Wales’ (2017) 
Archbold Review 4, 6. 
120 Miller, above n 118, p 221. 
121 Justice In the Dock: Reassessing the Use of the Dock in Criminal Trials (Justice, 2015) p 15, available at 
https://justice.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/07/JUSTICE-In-the-Dock.pdf (last accessed 17 May 2020). 
122 Mulcahy, above n 116, p 1144. 
123 It is also notable that, while the threat of adverse inferences interferes with the right not to participate, limited 
access to special measures can prevent the defendant from giving their best evidence. See below. 
124 See, for example, L Rosen ‘The dock - should it be abolished?’ (1966) 29 MLR 289; Miller, above n 118; 
Mulcahy, above n 116; Justice, above n 121. 
125 A study using mock jurors in Australia found that jurors are more likely to convict defendants when they are 
located in a dock, compared to having them sit next to their counsel at the bar table. See M Rossner, D Tait, B 
McKimmie and R Saare ‘The dock on trial: courtroom design and the presumption of innocence’ (2017) 44 Journal 
of Law and Society 317. 
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the cynosure of all eyes. He is placed, as it were, in a pillory, and must feel he is an object of scorn and 
derision.’
126
 Rosen describes the experience of being in the dock as ‘humiliating and degrading’.
127
 
Likewise, a report by JUSTICE asserts that ‘enclosing a person in a glass box or wooden pen is clearly 
an objectively humiliating experience and its rationale must be questioned as an affront to the dignity 
of proceedings.’
128
 Not only is it an affront to the dignity of the proceedings, but it is an affront to the 
dignity of the defendant. 
Due to its undignified nature, as well as its interference with the right to legal assistance and 
the presumption of innocence, routine use of the dock is unconstitutional in the United States.
129
 In 
Europe, the European Court of Human Rights has recognised that holding a defendant in a metal cage 
is degrading and constitutes an ‘affront to human dignity’ in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR.
130
 More 
recently, use of a glass dock has been successfully challenged in the European Court. The Court has 
held that, while confinement of the defendant in a glass dock does not in and of itself breach Article 3, 
it may do so if the circumstances of the confinement meet the minimum level of severity required to 
characterise the treatment as degrading within the meaning of  Article 3.
131
 This level of severity was 
reached in Alekhina v Russia, where the glass dock had been constantly surrounded (and observed) by 
armed police officers and court ushers, as well as a guard dog.
132
 The Court also found a breach of 
Article 6 on the grounds that the defendant’s position in the dock prevented free and private 
communication with their lawyers during the trial.
133
 There had been a violation of the right to 
participate effectively and the right to receive practical and effective legal assistance.  
	
126 Rosen, above n 124, p 297. 
127 Ibid, p 296. 
128 Justice, above n 121, p 24. 
129 See Illinois v Allen, 397 US 337 (1970); Young v Callahan, 700 F.2d 32, 36 (1 st Cir 1983); Deck v Missouri, 
544 US 622 (2005). 
130 See Svinarenko and Slyadnev v Russia  App no 32541/08 and 43441/08 (ECHR (GC), 17 July 2014) at [138]. 
131 See Yaroslav Belousov v Russia App no 2653/13 and 60980/14 (ECHR, 4 October 2016) at [125]. 
132 Alekhina v Russia (2019) 68 EHRR 14 at [147]-[149]. See also Yaroslav Belousov v Russia, above n 131, where 
Article 3 was breached due to the fact that 10 defendants had been held in a ‘glass cabin’ for two months of their 
high profile trial, with virtually no space between them. 
133 Alekhina v Russia, above n 132, at [166]-[172]. 
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Based on the European jurisprudence, the conditions in which most defendants in England and 
Wales sit in the dock are unlikely to breach Article 3.
134
 However, there is certainly scope to argue that 
English procedure, whereby defendants in the Crown Court are routinely placed in a secure dock, is 
incompatible with Article 6.
135
  The European Court has stressed that, while mindful of security issues, 
‘any measures restricting the defendant’s participation in the proceedings or imposing limitations on 
his or her relations with lawyers should only be imposed in so far as is necessary, and should be 
proportionate to the risks in a specific case.’
136
  
There is no legal authority requiring routine use of the dock, and experience in other 
jurisdictions proves that it is unnecessary. In South Africa, Ireland, and Denmark, for example, the dock 
is either non-existent or rarely used. Likewise, in the United States, a jurisdiction with higher rates of 
violent crime than England and Wales, the standard practice is for defendants to sit next to their counsel, 
and some lawyers make a conscious effort to appear at ease with their clients and to demonstrate the 
defendant’s involvement to the jury.
137
 Where defendants pose a real risk of violence or escape, 
additional security officers can be made available, or concealed restraints can be used. Campaigns in 
the 1960s and 1970s to limit or abolish the dock in England and Wales received considerable support 
from key stakeholders, including practitioners and politicians.
138
 More recently, objection to the dock 
has been voiced by academics,
139
 practitioners,
140
 JUSTICE,
141
 and the Howard League for Penal 
Reform.
142
 There also seems to be some judicial support for the prospect of abolishing the dock.
143
 A 
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135 Stone and Blackstock, above n 119, p 6. 
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Rowden, above n 114. 
140 See, for example, M Scott ‘Get rid of the docks!’ (2015) 179 Criminal Law and Justice Weekly 99; J Stone ‘Is 
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141 Justice, above n 121. 
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change to the seating arrangements in the courtroom should, therefore, constitute a relatively 
uncontroversial move towards taking participatory rights seriously and treating the defendant as the 
subject, rather than the object, of criminal proceedings.  
 
c. Special measures   
As noted above, it can be particularly difficult for children
144
 and other ‘vulnerable’
145
 defendants to 
navigate the formality and professionalisation of the court process. The court is required to take every 
reasonable step ‘to facilitate the participation of any person, including the defendant’.
146
 In accordance 
with the Criminal Practice Directions, this includes ‘enabling a witness or defendant to give their best 
evidence, and enabling a defendant to comprehend the proceedings and engage fully with his or her 
defence’.
147
 In furtherance of this Direction, special measures and trial adjustments can be put in place 
to assist those who are deemed to be vulnerable. In fact, while many adult defendants with no notable 
communication or health issues struggle to participate, it is in relation to vulnerable defendants that the 
most significant progress has been made to improve participation.
148
 However, for defendants, there are 
strict eligibility criteria and limited access to certain special measures. Although a full overview of 
special measures and trial adjustments is beyond the scope of this article,
149
 this section seeks to 
	
144 Young defendants are ordinarily tried in the youth court, where procedures are adapted to take account of age. 
However, trials for certain serious offences, including murder, take place in the Crown Court. While this article 
is concerned primarily with contested Crown Court trials, attaining meaningful participation is also an issue in the 
youth court. See, for example, C Robin-D’Cruz Young People’s Voices on Youth Court (Centre for Justice 
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Treatment Bench Book (Judicial College, 2018). 
149 See generally, P Cooper and H Norton (eds) Vulnerable People and the Criminal Justice System: A Guide to 
Law and Practice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017). 
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demonstrate that the current approach does not go far enough to facilitate the meaningful participation 
of vulnerable defendants. 
Many of the steps which the court can take to assist vulnerable defendants are set out in the 
Criminal Practice Directions.
150
 They include: adjustments to style and approach to questioning;
151
 
shortened sitting times and regular breaks; restricted attendance; removal of wigs and gowns; allowing 
the defendant to sit outside of the dock; and availability of a supporting adult. For the significant number 
of defendants who have communication difficulties,
152
 the assistance of an intermediary can be 
particularly helpful. Yet, it is in relation to the provision of intermediaries that we clearly see the 
shortcomings in present practice.  
Intermediaries are communication specialists who can facilitate witness’ understanding of, and 
communication with, the court.
153
 There is a statutory provision for defendant intermediaries, but it is 
not in force.
154
 Notably, the legislation only provides for defendant intermediaries to assist with giving 
evidence, and not to facilitate understanding during other parts of the proceedings. This in itself creates 
the impression that defendant participation is sought primarily (if not solely) as a means of acquiring 
evidence. Although the legislative provision is not in force, the court has inherent jurisdiction to appoint 
an intermediary to assist the defendant throughout criminal proceedings.
155
 While this is indicative of 
the  judicial commitment to supporting vulnerable defendants, the provision of intermediaries at 
common law is not satisfactory.
156
 Applications for defendant intermediaries have been granted by 
	
150 See CPD 3D-3G. 
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Communication with Vulnerable Witnesses and Defendants (Bristol: Policy Press 2015). 
154 YJCEA 1999, ss 33BA and 33BB, inserted by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s 104. 
155 See, for example, C v Sevenoaks Youth Court [2009] EWHC 3088 (Admin); CPD 3F.11-3F.18. 
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judges on an ad hoc basis, resulting in inconsistency.
157
 Defendants are excluded from the ‘Registered 
Intermediary’ scheme, so intermediaries for defendants are not quality-assured in the same way as 
intermediaries for non-defendant witnesses.
158
 Also, there are significant resource issues, particularly 
in terms of funding and identifying available intermediaries. Resourcing concerns have resulted in 
amendments to the Criminal Practice Directions which now explicitly seek to limit the provision of 
intermediaries for defendants (no such limits have been explicitly placed on the provision of 
intermediaries for eligible non-defendant witnesses).
159
 In accordance with the Directions, 
intermediaries should be appointed to assist defendants to give evidence only ‘rarely’, and appointment 
for the duration of a trial should be ‘extremely rare’.
160
 This position has been supported by the Court 
of Appeal.
161
 In Rashid, the Court took the view that, in the overwhelming majority of cases, competent 
legal representation and good trial management is sufficient to assist participation and ensure a fair 
trial.
162
  
Thus, in place of intermediaries, most defendants with communication problems must rely on: 
adjustment to the language used in court;
163
 ‘competent legal representation’;
164
 and, where additional 
assistance is necessary, ‘a support worker or other appropriate companion who can provide that 
assistance’.
165
 Intermediaries are not always required when all that is needed to facilitate understanding 
is a simple change to the style of questioning or language used in court. However, lawyers, or other 
‘suitable supporting adults’,
166
 should not be regarded as a convenient, resource-neutral substitute for 
an intermediary.
167
 Lawyers and intermediaries can have significantly different opinions on what kind 
	
157 Law Commission, above n 5, para 1.27. 
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of adaptations to language or questioning is required to facilitate understanding, with lawyers missing 
problems that can be identified by intermediaries.
168
 Moreover, an intermediary may be necessary to 
enable the defendant to communicate with their lawyer outside of the courtroom. Arguably, the 
legislature and, more recently, the appellate courts have been too quick to prioritise resourcing concerns 
at the expense of ‘enabling a defendant to comprehend the proceedings and engage fully with his or her 
defence’. This creates the impression that doing justice to the accused is not worth the cost. 
There are also shortcomings in respect of the one statutory special measure that is available to 
defendants: live-link.
169
 Live-link enables the defendant to give their evidence from outside of the 
courtroom. By removing them from the busy and intimidating courtroom environment, the defendant 
may be better able to concentrate, thus increasing their ability to understand the questions put to them, 
respond in a coherent and consistent manner, and engage with the questioner. However, eligibility 
criteria for live-link is strict.  In accordance with section 33A of the YJCEA 1999, live-link is only 
available to defendants where it is in the interests of justice and, additionally, either: the defendant is 
under the age of 18, their ability to participate effectively as a witness is compromised by their level of 
intellectual ability or social functioning, and the use of live-link would enable them to participate more 
effectively as a witness; or the defendant is unable to participate effectively as a witness due to a mental 
disorder or other significant impairment of intelligence and social function, and the use of live-link 
would enable them to participate more effectively as a witness.
170
 
The eligibility criteria for defendants is more restrictive than that for other witnesses. For 
example, unlike non-defendant witnesses, the legislation does not provide for live-link where a physical 
disability prevents the defendant from giving evidence in the courtroom.
171
 Nor are defendants eligible 
for live-link on the grounds of fear or distress about testifying.
172
 The lack of parity is most stark in 
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respect of children, as young non-defendant witnesses are automatically eligible for live-link.
173
 Implicit 
in the rules that apply to non-defendant witnesses is recognition that the quality of a child’s evidence, 
and their ability to give evidence effectively, may be improved if they are not in the courtroom. It is 
unclear why this logic does not also apply to young defendants, particularly given that child defendants 
‘are often amongst the most disadvantaged and the least able to give a good account of themselves’.
174
 
The current approach of prioritising special measures for non-defendant witnesses does little to signal 
that the defendant is the subject and key stakeholder in the proceedings. 
The disparity in the availability of special measures for defendants and other witnesses has been 
the subject of much academic criticism,
175
 not least because it interferes with the principle of equality 
of arms.
176
 In its report on unfitness to plead, the Law Commission recommended greater provision of 
special measures for defendants and that the eligibility criteria for live-link be brought into line with 
that for non-defendant witnesses.
177
 However, changes to eligibility criteria are unlikely to suffice. A 
small-scale study conducted by Fairclough shows that, even where live-link is available to defendants, 
the statutory provision is rarely invoked.
178
 Fairclough attributes this to a number of factors, including: 
lack of awareness of the live-link provision among legal professionals; poor identification of 
vulnerability by those working within the legal profession;
179
 and, importantly, lack of perceived 
practical benefit or tactical advantage. According to the legal professionals interviewed by Fairclough, 
the function of live-link is to keep witnesses out of the courtroom entirely. Since defendants sit in the 
courtroom up to the point at which they are called to give evidence, it may appear unnecessary to remove 
them in order to testify.
180
 Moreover, some thought that the defendant’s absence from the courtroom 
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could be viewed as suspicious by the jury, or would diminish the impact of the defendant’s testimony 
on the jury.
181
  
Examination through live-link (as well as use of other measures and adjustments) is not in the 
best interest of every eligible defendant, and some vulnerable defendants will be able to give evidence 
more effectively in the courtroom than from a distance. Nonetheless, the attitudes expressed by some 
of the participants in Fairclough’s study are representative of the ‘us and them’ mentality in so far as 
they reveal a lack of awareness of (or concern about) the extent of the difficulties faced by some 
defendants in court.
182
 Fairclough’s analysis also indicates that the defendant’s ability to understand and 
communicate is not viewed as a priority in criminal proceedings. Nor is meaningful defendant 
participation a priority for the legislature, as evidenced by the fact that, unlike non-defendant witnesses, 
special measures for defendants were introduced by the government in ‘grudging recognition’
183
 of the 
challenges faced by vulnerable defendants, as a response to findings against the UK in the European 
Court of Human Rights.
184
  
 It is worth briefly noting the relevance of special measures in cases where the defendant may 
not be able to exercise their right to effective participation. Given that special measures were introduced 
to enable defendants to have a fair trial, it is understandable that the availability of special measures and 
trial adjustments increases the likelihood of a judge finding that the defendant can participate 
effectively.
185
 However, the value of special measures in individual cases may be speculative, as 
evidenced by the fact that experts do not always agree on which adjustments or measures, if any, will 
enable effective participation.
186
 As noted elsewhere, it is, therefore, concerning that, where assistance 
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is available, this can overshadow the problems faced by those who would struggle with participating 
and who do not wish to participate.
187
 Eligibility for special measures should signal that a defendant 
will have particular difficulty in following proceedings or giving evidence. Yet, the availability of 
special measures has not only contributed to findings that defendants with severe communication 
problems can participate effectively, but also that they should actively participate in their trials, and that 
adverse inferences may be drawn against them if they do not give evidence.
188
 Again, it seems that 
defendant participation is not sought as a means of giving effect to the proposed rationales for 
participatory rights. Rather, it is desired in pursuit of the instrumental values of participation that benefit 
the state, namely efficient fact-finding, with defendants being expected to provide evidence even if they 
may not be able to do so adequately. This claim is strengthened by the fact that adverse inferences have 
been permitted against a silent defendant who, despite being granted an intermediary to help give 
evidence, had no such assistance at his trial.
189
 Expecting defendants to actively participate when they 
do not feel that they are in a position to do so meaningfully, and then penalising their failure to 
participate, provides a key example of the way in which the defendant’s position as the autonomous 
subject of the proceedings has been disregarded. 
Increasing recognition among academics, practitioners and policymakers, that more can and 
should be done to support vulnerable defendants is to be welcomed.
190
 While not always sufficient, 
special measures can enable some defendants to better engage in a dialogue with the court, challenge 
the prosecution case, and understand the basis for conviction or acquittal. If we appreciate the 
defendant’s status as the subject of criminal proceedings and as someone who should be taken seriously, 
then we have reason to do all that we can to facilitate their participation. Consequently, formal eligibility 
criteria for special measures should be relaxed, such that defendants are eligible for assistance on at 
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188 See, for example, R v D, above n 185; O’Donnell v UK, above n 186; R v Mulindwa [2017] EWCA Crim 416. 
189 R v Biddle, above n 161. The Court was not convinced that there was a causative link between the defendant’s 
silence and the absence of an intermediary. Also, note that if the court finds that special measures are necessary 
to ensure a fair trial, but the measures cannot be put in place, the proceedings should be stayed as an abuse of 
process. See R v Akhtar [2016] EWCA Crim 390.  
190 See, for example, The Bradley Report, above n 152, p 61; Talbot, above n 5, p 3; Lord Carlile, above n 84, p 
28; Law Commission, above n 5, paras 2.21-2.94; Justice, above n 152, pp 101-102; Plotnikoff and Woolfson, 
above n 182, ch 5.8. 
31	
	
least the same basis as other witnesses. Relaxing eligibility requirements should be accompanied by an 
increase in resources for special measures, alongside effective procedures for identifying those who 
could benefit from assistance. At the same time, however, special measures and trial adjustments must 
not be viewed as a catch-all solution that can enable effective participation in every case, and those who 
choose not to give evidence should not face adverse inferences being drawn against them. To achieve 
a position in which effective and meaningful participation can be facilitated, but not forced, greater 
appreciation must be had for the rationales which underpin participatory rights, with special measures 
and trial adjustments viewed as one means of giving effect to those rationales.    
 
4. TAKING PARTICIPATORY RIGHTS SERIOUSLY  
It has been argued that the function of the criminal trial is to call the state to account for the accusations 
made against the defendant, before the defendant is subjected to condemnation and punishment. During 
this process of proof, the defendant should be treated as the subject, and not the object, of the 
proceedings. This is because, as an autonomous member of a liberal polity, the defendant is inherently 
worthy of dialogue. To treat the defendant as the subject of the proceedings is to respect them as a 
participant,
191
 which means giving effect to participatory rights, and providing a forum in which those 
rights can be exercised effectively. It also means listening to what the defendant has to say and taking 
their contributions seriously. Unfortunately, this normative account is not adequately reflected in 
current practice. While some defendants have sufficient experience or capacity to engage in the court 
process, it is seemingly more common for defendants to feel confused or excluded. Where effort is 
made to enable defendants to exercise their participatory rights, it tends to be focussed on those who 
are deemed to be vulnerable. Yet, the current regime of special measures and trial adjustments for 
vulnerable defendants suffers from serious limitations. 
To facilitate meaningful participation, the court process and the court environment must 
become more accessible and hospitable. While many legal professionals seek to empathetically engage 
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with defendants, there remains an obvious need to better, and more consistently and systemically, 
incorporate the principles of procedural justice, as advocated above. We should strive to enable all 
defendants to understand what is happening and why, and feel included and able to exercise their 
participatory rights. In pursuit of this goal, some simple changes have been advocated, including: a less 
restrictive application of the right to effective participation; a more diverse and representative legal 
profession; dispensing with antiquated legal language and speaking in a clear and simple manner 
throughout court proceedings; allowing defendants to sit near their legal representatives; and better 
provision of special measures for vulnerable defendants. 
It is unlikely that these developments would result in complete understanding or engagement 
of all defendants. For some, disengagement from the court process may be rooted in underlying 
problems of social exclusion and dissatisfaction. For others, it may be in their best interest to take a 
passive role and allow their legal representative to present their case.
192
 Still, changes to law, practice 
and court culture could make a significant difference for many defendants. Given the simple and 
straightforward nature of most of the proposals, the fact that some have already been adopted in respect 
of vulnerable witnesses,
193
 and the fact that influential campaign groups continue to advocate for 
change,
194
 we must return to the question of why significant barriers to the meaningful participation of 
defendants in court continue to exist. Part of the explanation could be lack of resources, as facilitating 
meaningful and effective participation is likely to clash with the current focus on efficiency. However, 
it is submitted that the primary explanation is lack of regard for the rationales for participatory rights. 
Too often defendant participation is viewed primarily as a means of efficient fact-finding, with 
defendants well placed to help with early identification of the ‘real issues’ in the case,
195
 as well as 
provide relevant evidence. This has resulted in the imposition of penalties against those who do not 
actively participate when called upon to do so. Thus, while it is possible to improve meaningful 
communication by and with defendants, this depends on a broader change in perspective among those 
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who make and apply the law and procedure. Respect for individual dignity and autonomy requires that 
we do not oblige defendants to actively participate in proceedings against themselves, but, at the same 
time, provide an opportunity to do so. For those who would prefer to focus on the instrumental benefits 
of facilitating meaningful participation, it is worth reiterating that giving a voice to those most affected 
by the criminal process enhances the legitimacy of the process and the outcome of trials.  
